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The Pearl River Delta is one of the most successful cases of
economic re-integration after a long period of separation. Hong
Kong's traditional policy of non-interventionism and China's
open-door policy have induced a rapid increase in cross-border
trade, outward processing and outward investment.
The paper focuses on the different modes of integration as well
as on the driving forces behind. It argues that small- and me-
dium-sized enterprises have played the pivotal role in the Delta's
economic development. Their cross-border operations have
been mainly facilitated through two channels: through subcon-
tracting networks among manufacturers and through links with
trading houses which are frequently small in size.
The paper underlines three main keys to the Delta's economic
success: a non-interventionist policy favourable for growth, a
pronounced outward orientation in business which consequently
exploits complementaries in comparative advantages and, last
but not least, the so-called Chinese factor — the special atti-
tudes adopted by local entrepreneurs, their adaptability and flexi-
bility, their work ethics and their common cultural heritage.
In some respects, the Pearl River Delta can serve as a model for
developing border regions in Central Europe along the former
Iron Curtain. Despite their great potential, these regions are in-
tegrating only slowly. The paper suggests that border regions
after a long period of political and economic division are predes-
tined to become an economic power-house. (F2, 053, R12)I Introduction: Economic Integration in Border Regions
1
In recent years, the economics of border regions have repeatedly been
covered in the literature [Altzinger and Maier 1996; Hanson 1995; Jones,
King and Klein 1993]. There are mainly two reasons for the increasing
attention given to this subject: first, a renaissance of the market system as
a means of liberalizing and deregulating cross-border trade and factor
movements in western market systems, and second, the collapse of the
socialist system in Central and Eastern Europe has opened rather closed
economies. Economic theory suggests that countries, when moving from
autarky to free trade conditions, tend to speed up mutual integration with-
out difficulty. If the regional conditions of production are different and if in
this case a rich and a poor country share a common border, there is a
large potential to be tapped by the international division of labour across
very short distances. Thus, economic integration usually starts in border
regions where information and transport costs are lower than in regions
lying farther apart.
There are only a few places in the world where countries with consider-
able differences in development and income, caused by a long period of
economic and political separation, share a common border. Three exam-
ples do stand out:
Research for this paper was undertaken with support from the European Commission's
Phare ACE Program 1995 ..Integrating Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Trans-
formation Countries into the European Trade Flows and Co-operation Schemes", project-
no. 94-0724-R. An earlier version of the paper was prepared for a workshop held at the
Universita degli Studi di Trento in Trento on March 7-8, 1997. Maciej Grabowski, Katja
Gerling, Birgit Sander, Jana Sereghyova and Dean Spinanger have given very useful
comments, and Wolfgang Winkler has improved the language.• The first example is the Pearl River Delta, which is the area around
Hong Kong, Macau and Guangdong in Southern China. This area
has experienced an enormous economic growth since the Peoples'
Republic of China started to open the country for foreign investment
in 1978.
• The second example comprises the regions along the border be-
tweenjhe United States and Mexico from the Rio Grande to the Pa-
cific Ocean, the so-called Maquiladoras. There, we can also find a
strong dynamic process based on the introduction of free economic
activity zones in the 1960s on the Mexican side in connection with
: offshore processing legislation on the US side.
• The third example are the regions along the former Iron Curtain, from
the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea. Despite their great potential, these
border regions are integrating slowly. Close co-operations between
enterprises on both sides of the border are still rare. Commercial ac-
tivities are basically concentrated on ambulant vendors and prostitu-
tion. It is. not easy to explain this lack of interaction.
The current paper examines the ongoing integration process between
Hong Kong and the Guangdong province. It outlines some of the features
and specific issues of positive collaboration which has made the Pearl
River Delta distinctive in economic terms. The region can be taken as a
contemporary experiment of successful territorial re-integration. The aim
of the paper is to analyze the process and to find out to which extent this
experiment can serve as a model for the development of a prospering





• first illustrates the specific conditions relevant to Hong Kong-Chinese
relations,
• second examines the forms of cross-border operations,
• third highlights the driving forces behind integration,
• fourth explains the role of SMEs in co-operation, and finally
• draws lessons for developing border regions.
The paper is based on official statistics published by the Hong Kong gov-
ernment as well as on the vast amount of literature available on the topicsconcerned. Some personal interviews with academics in Hong-Kong pro-
vided further information for reviewing economic development in the
Delta. .,-. ;
II Specific Conditions of Hong Kong-Chinese Relations
Although capitalist Hong Kong and communist China maintained various
degrees of economic relations after 1949, the major breakthrough only
came after 1978 following the implementation of economic reforms in;
China. In 1979, China greatly increased the autonomy of some of Wsl
southern provinces allowing them to carry out foreign trade and foreign?
investment independently. Four types of privileged areas were legalized::
(1) special economic zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and
Xiamen, (2) open coastal port cities (CPCs) in Zhanjiang, Guangzhou,
and Fuzhou, (3) economic and technical development areas (ETDAs) in
selected cities, and (4) open coastal economic areas (OCEAs) in the
Pearl River Delta and in Fujian Province. Of these, the three SEZs in
Guangdong Province have played the most important roie in the integra-
tion process. . ;
Privileged areas have three outstanding features [Dezhao 1994; Kwok
and Ames 1995]: :
They are windows to the outside world and are aimed at attracting
modern technology, capital and managerial skills.
They are open, although clearly demarcated and guarded areas for
experiments in capitalist market economy.
They are filters to shelter the rest of China from foreign influences.Chart 2 - Comparison of Preferential Treatment for Foreign-Funded
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The choice of the southern provinces and in particular of the Guangdong
Province as locations for privileged areas was mainly based on geo-
graphic considerations. Their proximity to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan
was regarded as the most compelling factor: neighbours tend to trade with
each other, in particular with culturally similar ones, not just because
transport costs are low but because transaction costs at all levels are low.
In order to attract foreign investors, preferential treatments were initiated
by the Chinese government. They included income tax allowances and
exemption from industrial and commercial taxes as well as from export
and import tariffs for foreign-funded enterprises (Chart 2). For instance,
SEZ-based manufacturing enterprises enjoy a preferential 15 percent in-
come tax rate, full exemption from customs duties for their imported raw
materials, intermediate inputs and equipment and their exported goods.
Thus, these enterprises are encouraged to export most of their production
output.
Whereas the Chinese authorities have to a certain extent actively pro-
moted, guided and controlled the economic development in the Pearl
River Delta, on the Hong Kong side, the government has almost com-
pletely abstained from public intervention. Consonant with its basic free-
market policy stance, Hong Kong has neither pursued a policy to ease
adjustment pressure on industries which have been outstripped by low-
cost competitors nor has it pushed industries with favourable prospects. It
was up to entrepreneurs to rapidly expand trade and investment links with
adjacent territories beyond the borders, either near or far. In doing so, only
industries in line with Hong Kong's comparative advantages remained,
thus setting the condition necessary for strong overall expansion. The role
of economic policy was to focus mainly on removing impediments tostructural change and spurring factor productivity through upgrading the
territory's infrastructure and skill base [GATT 1994; Chau 1994]. ^
On 1 July 1997, the sovereignty over Hong Kong will be reverted to
China —to the central government, not to"the provincial government in
Guangdong. The process of political integration with the mainland will be
designed and controlled by Beijing. As an autonomous Special Adminis-
trative Area (SAR), Hong Kong cannot become the political center of the
Pearl River Delta. Economically, however, it will remain or even
strengthen its leading position [So and Kwok 1995]. The direction of Hong
Kong's capitalist economy towards increasing integration with the market-
socialist economy of China, especially South China, is more or less a fact
for business life — whatever Hong Kong's political future might be.
Ill Forms of Hong Kong-Chinese Cross-Border Operations
Economic integration between regions can occur by different modes: by
cross-border trade, by investments and by other forms of co-operation
such as outward processing arrangements. Historically, Hong Kong was,
besides Shanghai, the most important entrepot for China. In the late
1970s, when Beijing opened up its door to the western world, it re-
emerged as a conduit for the trade between China and the rest of the
world.
Meanwhile, Hong Kong and, in particular, Guangdong Province have
reached a higher stage of co-operation — along with the shift of Hong
Kong manufacturing production beyond the border. The most common
types of business in the Pearl River region are consignment and, respec-
tively, commissioned processing and compensation trade. Hong Kong's
manufacturers, confronted with soaring labour costs and land prices, havea
gradually relocated their production basis to the mainland, especially to
the neighbouring province of Guangdong, where a plentiful supply of
cheaper labour and land is available. This has led to a shift in Hong
Kong's export composition away from domestic exports towards re-
exports, and to a shift in its economic structure away from manufacturing
towards services.
The establishment of Hong Kong factories has made that region the larg-
est recipient of foreign direct investment in China. Most of the investment
is concentrated in small- and medium-sized companies producing light
industrial products, primarily for export to Hong Kong and third countries.
In addition to direct investment, Hong Kong has been an important; mid-
dleman in raising foreign capital for China,: However, Hong Kong'sand
China's economic integration has not remained a one-way street. Inves-
tors from China have become big players in the Hong Kong capital mar-
ket. They have, e.g., become the largest external investors in the colony's
property market and have reached a sizeable claim on Hong Kong's
banking system. It is tempting to view China's growing position in Hong
Kong's economy as part of a grand design to control it effectively after the
political take-over of the colony in 1997.
1 Foreign Trade
The explosive growth of cross-border trade between Hong Kong and
China is mirrored in the statistics (Table 1). In recent years, two-way trade
increased by some 25 percent per annum. China is now Hong Kong's
largest trading partner, with a volume of 1,582 bill. HK dollars in 1995,
39 percent of Hong Kong's total two-way trade, compared with 11.3 per-
cent in 1980 and 8.1 percent in 1970.• China is Hong Kong's largest supplier of imports, accounting for
42 percent of Hong Kong's total imports. However; 52 percent of the
imported goods are re-exported overseas.
2 This underscores the role
of Hong Kong as an entrepot for trade between China and the rest of
the world.
• China is Hong Kong's second largest destination for exports, ac-
counting for 33 percent of Hong Kong's total exports.
Table 1 - Hong Kong's Visible Trade with China 1970-1995
(mill. HK dollars)
Total exports to China
Domestic exports to China
Re-exports to China V
Total imports from China
Imports retained in Hong Kong
Re-exports to elsewhere
Note:































Source: Sit [1995]; Hong Kong Monthly Statistics [1996].
Official trade statistics do not provide separate figures on cross-border
trade flows in the Pearl River Delta. Chinese customs statistics are not
available on the provincial level. However, there is no question that Hong
Kong as well as neighbouring Guangdong account for the bulk of mutual
trade. According to Sung [1995], in 1990 Guangdong's exports to Hong
Kong can reliably be estimated to amount to 86 percent of its total ex-
Although China re-classified the destination of its exports via Hong Kong since 1993, a
substantial share of its exports is still classified as exports to Hong Kong because China
argues to be unable to trace the final destination of all its exports.10
ports. Reciprocally, Guangdong's imports from Hong Kong accounted for
72 percent of its total imports. ' '
Apart from trade in commodities, trade in services between China and
Hong Kong has become extremely important.
• On the one side, Hong Kong is a net exporter of transportation serv-
ices, tourist services, trading services, financial services and busi-
ness services. It raises, for instance, 80 percent of China's syndi-
cated loans.;Although in many cases the colony is not the direct
source of funds, it serves as a convenient window for China. The
/shares of numerous state-owned Chinese enterprises are listed at
the stock exchange in Hong Kong [Tang 1994].
• On the other side, China is very active in construction projects in
Hong Kong. A large number of workers from the mainland are work-
ing in Hong Kong. In recent years, China's export of medical services
has also sharply increased: Hong Kong residents are travelling to the
mainland for medical treatment as the prices for those services are
lower than in Hong Kong [Sung 1995].
Since Hong Kong has rapidly moved from a traditional manufacturing to a
service-oriented "manufacturing management" [Tuan and Ng 1995a], a
change in the mix of its trade with China is observable — from the export
of goods to the export of services.
2 Outward Processing
A special feature of Hong Kong-Chinese cross-border operations is the
high share of outward processing trade in total trade. In 1994, nearly
50 percent of Hong Kong's total exports were destined to and about11
80 percent of its total imports originated from outward processing
(Table 2). Since 1980, manufacturers in the colony began to relocate their
production across the border, specializing in "front office operations" such
as finance, marketing, design, packaging and quality control [Chau 1993].
About 95 percent of their outward processing arrangements are located in
the Pearl River Delta, mostly just north of the border in and around
Shenzhen [Tang 1995]. According to an often cited estimate, Hong Kong-
based companies and their mainland partners in Guangdong Province
employed in the early 1990s about three million workers in over
25,000 factories [Financial Times 1993], but meanwhile the number of
workers is considered higher, probably close to five million. This vast off-
shore force is tenfold the colony's own working population in manufactur-
ing which has come down, to less than half a million, while in the early
1980s the number-of manufacturing employees: in Hong Kong was twice
as high [Tuan and Ng 1995b].
Table 2 - Share of Outward Processing Trade in Hong Kong's Total
Trade with China 1989 and 1993
Total exports to China
Domestic exports to China
Re-exports to China
Total imports from China
Imports retained in Hong Kong
Re-exports to elsewhere
Note:
Share of OPT imports from
Guangdong in total OPT imports
from China
a















Source: Hong Kong Monthly Statistics [1995].12
f able 3 - Exports by Hong Kong Companies by Origin of their Production
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aRanked in descending order of share of exports produced in Guangdong. -
 bHong Kong's domestic exports. -
cRe-exports of Guangdong origin involving OPT. .
Source: Sung [1995].
Detailed investigations regarding exports carried out by companies based
in Hong Kong and operating in the colony as
5 well as in Guangdong by
commodity groups indicate that so-called footloose industries and, above
all, labour-intensive industries are the most important candidates for out-
ward processing (Table 3). In 1993, for instance, 95 percent of Hong
Kong-based firms' exports of travel goods, handbags and toys were pro-
duced in Guangdong. More skill-intensive industries such as office ma-
chines and automatic data-processing machines still held a lower share.
However, there is a trend towards technology-intensive products: Hong
Kong manufacturers are increasingly setting up R&D and design divisions
in China, making use of the relatively low salaries of scientists and pro-
fessionals there. Surprisingly, the shares of textiles and clothing are rela*
tively small. This can be explained by the existing origin rules which gov-
ern the export of wearing apparel and textile products to Hong Kong's
major markets. These products are subject to restrictions on locally-made
contents. As a result, many Hong Kong textile and garment manufactur-
ers have retained their production base in the colony.Bibisothek des Instituts
aft Kief 13
Outward processing in the mainland is manifested in a number of forms,
in particular
• processing of materials provided by Hong Kong companies,
• processing of products in line with specifications based on designs or
samples sent by Hong Kong companies,
• assembling and processing of components or semi-finished products
delivered by Hong Kong companies,
• producing components or semi-finished goods as payment for use or
lease of machinery and equipment provided by Hong Kong compa-
nies.
It is easy to understand why Hong Kong companies have a preference for
commissioned production: this form of co-operation does not necessarily
need a substantial equity involvement and poses, therefore, no capital
risk. In addition, it does not require approval by the Chinese central and
provincial governments but can be readily approved by iocal authorities.
3 Outward Investment
Hong Kong has accumulated a substantial stock of investment in the
mainland, making China the largest recipient of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Asia. Most of the capital was invested in the Pearl River Delta
with its two Special Economic Zones of Shenzhen and Zhuhai and some
other principal cities such as Guangzhou, Dongguan, Foshan, Jiangmen
and Zhongshan. It was estimated that from 1986 to 1991 the colony ac-
counted for 60 percent of FDI in China and for 80 percent in Guangdong
Province (Table 4). From 1986 to 1991, the share of FDI to Guangdong in
total FDi to China increased steadily. As a result, Guangdong is now one14
of the top performers among all Chinese provinces in terms of economic
growth. .i-i



































































Most of the investment is strongly linked with Hong Kong-based manufac-
turers' cross-border processing. Although an offshore plant can be ex-
pected to work on its own, frequently support on part of the contractor is
desirable — in order to improve and control product quality, to safeguard
delivery times, to install modern machinery and equipment and to pre-
finance wage and overhead costs. However, much of Hong Kong's out-
ward processing tends to be relatively sophisticated. Therefore it requires
a higher degree of co-operation and, in particular, a long-term commit-
ment among the partners. As a result, a large number of Hong Kong com-
panies is involved in joint ventures and co-operation ventures which are
still the dominant type of FDI in China (Table 5). In recent years, there has
been a shift towards fully-owned subsidiaries, too. According to a survey
among members of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries [1992] the
majority of Hong Kong investors favours this form of investment because15
it allows them to have more control over management and hence more
flexibility in responding to market changes. In particular, there is no need
for time-consuming consultations with the Chinese side before decisions
can be made.
















































Source: Chen and He [1994].
Investment in the Pearl River Delta has not been a one-way street. In re-
cent years, China's investment in Hong Kong has also been progressing
very well, especially in construction, building, shipping and manufacturing.
China is now the largest investor in Hong Kong manufacturing. Much of
Chinese investments are in high-tech industries. Such investments serve
as a bridge for importing modern technology and training personnel from
the mainland.
IV Driving Forces Behind Hong Kong-Chinese Integration
Economic integration in the Pearl River Delta is, without any doubt, un-
paralleled by other border regions in the world. In tapping the region's
potential for integration, one has to take into account the ideal combina-16
tion of economic complementaries, geographic proximity, institutional
links and cultural ties. From a theoretical point of view .
• large differentials in factor endowment and factor prices make an in-
tensive (inter-industry) division of labour mutually beneficial because
the use of resources can be optimized;
• short distances reduce transaction costs and transportation costs;
• political commitment of the governments involved and policy co-ordi-
nation create a favourable climate for business/ and appropriate
policies relating to tariffs and quotas, tax rates, regulations' and for-
eign exchange encourage the private sector for cross-border opera-
i tions; „ .
• common language and culture and close kinship make communica-
tion easier.
Needless to say, political and economic partners on both sides of the bor-
der must be able and willing to do their best. As long as China is commit-
ted to continuing and deepening its open door policy and the Pearl River
Delta enjoys its free market environment, the process of integration can
be expected to proceed rapidly [Kam and Spinanger 1996],
1 Differences in Factor Endowment
Differences in resource endowment, and accordingly in resource pricesy
have been the main force driving the integration in the Pearl River Delta:
• Hong Kong suffers from a shortage of land and labour. In particular,
rising wages and soaring land prices push firms to relocate their pro-
duction to the neighbouring province.17
• China, in contrast, has abundant labour and land. Therefore, these
are relatively inexpensive. Although wages and land prices,prevalent
in its coastal province are much higher than in the hinterland, they
make up only a small fraction of those encountered in Hong Kong.
According to a survey among Hong Kong manufacturing firms, 86 percent
of outward processors and outward investors flagged "high labour costs'"
and 53 percent "high land prices" as major problems in Hong Kong,
prompting them to build up an operational base in the Pearl River Delta
[Federation of Hong Kong Industries 1992].
Comparisons of differences in production costs jn the Pearl River Delta
are difficult to establish due to diffefences in the quality of factor input and
factor productivity. Labour in the mainland, e.g., tends to be less skilled
and the nature of technology used there is relatively simple and more la-
bour-intensive than in Hong Kong. However, results from different surveys
suggest that production expenses incurred in mainland subsidiaries were
only one fourth of total costs on average. In Guangdong, productivity was
estimated to be about 70 percent of that achieved in Hong Kong for all
types of labour, wages to be 20 percent for factory workers and 50 per-
cent for staff in 1993 [Tuan and Ng 1994b]. Even in Shenzhen, where
production costs have risen drastically in recent years and where wages
are on average three to four times higher than in the Pearl River Delta,
Hong Kong firms still enjoy favourable investment conditions.
Nevertheless, the attractiveness of the most highly preferred locations, in
particular Shenzhen and Zhuhai, is fading in comparison to the hinterland,
since disparities in terms of production costs are dramatically increasing.
Already at the beginning of the 1990s, per capita GDP (as a proxy for la-
bour costs) in Shenzhen and Zhuhai was five and, resp., three times18
higher than in Huizhou (Table 6). While in the hinterland it is relatively
easy for workers to move from the inland provinces to the Pearl River
Delta, in SEZs immigration is restricted by the so-called Frontier License
System or by other policy measures. As a result, the labour market in
Shenzhen and Zhuhai has become increasingly characterized by short-
age.
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Source; Jun [1994]; own computations.
Nevertheless, the existing cost differences are a solid basis for an ongo-
ing economic integration in the Pearl River Delta. They will help to push
Guangdong Province from a domestic demand dominated, lesser devel-
oped Chinese province to an export-led, open and affluent province.
Moreover, they will continue to promote the transformation of Hong Kong
from a manufacturing export enclave into the hub of a fully-fledged serv-
ice-oriented cosmopolitan center in the Asia-Pacific region.19
2 Geographic Proximity
According to several polls, geographic proximity is another key factor for
Hong Kong firms choosing the Pearl River Delta as a production base
which facilitates transportation, management and control, technology
transfer and access to back-up services. Seen from Hong Kong, most of
the popular places for processing operations and investment are within a
distance of less than 100 miles.
Geographic proximity, however, should not only be measured in terms of
distances. Rapid economic integration in the Delta has also been based
on heavy investment in the infrastructure with the greatest burst in the
1980s following the adoption of the open door policy by China [Yeung
1994]. While Hong Kong steadily expanded its investment since World
War II, China neglected the development of transport facilities, of water
and electricity supply and of housing projects until the early; 1980s. As a
result, many factories in the Delta could not operate at full capacity due to
shortages in transport and power supply. In this respect, China has made
considerable efforts to improve the situation. Particularly, provincial and
local authorities have taken the initiative in making large infrastructure
improvements. In recent years, an impressive number of new projects
have been planned, started or implemented (Chart 3).Chart 3 O
Figure 6
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PEARL RIVER DELTA, 1993
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Importantly, a large share of projects have been privately financed. In re-
cent years, self-financing of infrastructure has even become fh6 most im-
portant modality. Raising funds in the capital market had not been a
problem, except for those projects in Hong Kong which the Chinese side
had opposed for political reasons.
3 Institutional Links
The institutional framework constitutes a symbiosis of China's market so-
cialism practised in the coastal regions and Hong Kong's laissez-faire
system. Therefore, both pushing and pulling factors deserve credit. In
1978, China started its open-door policy as part of its Economic Reform.
In the years to follow, the government established selected frontier;zones;
(Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) and'Open
Regions (ORs)) which are all located in South China, the most important
of these being Guangdong. In contrast, Hong Kong has always been an
open entrepot for trade and financial transactions. Although legally the
United Kingdom (still) assumes financial responsibility, the territory has
long benefited from a considerable amount of autonomy, allowing to de-
fine and pursue its own policy in foreign trade, money and finance.;This
has helped to establish one of the world's most liberal trade and invest-
ment regimes. ;• -,,-.
Nevertheless, economic integration in the Pearl River Delta has been ad-
vanced from the bottom rather than from the top — from markets rather
than from governments. Even after 1 July 1997, when China will resume
sovereignty over Hong Kong, the region will be politically less integrated
than the member countries of the EU. Hong Kong will become a Special
Administration Region (SAR), will remain a separate customs territory and22
will be shielded from migration. Clearly, since the Sino-British Joint Decla-
ration of 1984 which scheduled the return of Hong Kong to China, political
ties have become closer. Since then, the governments of Hong Kong and
of Guangdong Province have concluded agreements regarding border-
crossing procedures, train, truck, ferry and airflight services and direct
telephone networks.
4 Cultural Ties
Finally, the cultural ties between Hong Kong and thejnainland are close.
Many Hong Kong residents have their ancestral roots in the Pearl River
Delta. Despite being separated for a long period of time, they have been
in close contact to their relatives. Closeness of kinship is traditionally an
important factor in Chinese business. Besides low labour costs and geo-
graphic proximity, familiarity with the environment in the Delta is consid-
ered one of the most important factors for investment there [Federation of
Hong Kong Industries 1992]. Familiarity can substantially reduce the
transaction costs of business. In recent years, after the border-crossing
procedures became easier, millions of Hong Kong people visited their na-
tive villages and took advantage of the opportunity to refresh family ties
that have lasted for generations [Guldin 1995]. Although residents in the
Pearl River Delta are internally divided into various groups (depending on
the location of their native villages within China) and have distinctive dia-
lects, Cantonese is the lingua franca which is understood by almost all of
them. A communication problem, usually the main impediment to eco-
nomic integration in border regions, does not exist.
In recent years, social and cultural integration in the Pearl River Delta has
been efficiently facilitated by the mass media. Television, radio, movies23
and videos have become the conduit for mutual cultural penetration. This
has helped to stop or even to reverse the ongoing process of linguistic
bifurcation which had progressed during the period of separation [Guldin
1995]. :
V Role of SMEs in Hong Kong-Chinese Co-operation
An outstanding feature in Hong Kong's outward processing and invest-
ment in the Pearl River Delta is the predominanee.of SMEs. In 1960* soon
after the start of the colony's industrialization, the average firm size in
manufacturing was 41 employees, which was already small by, interna-h
tional standards. By 1970, the average number of employees hadlfallentp;,
15. SMEs'accounted for 99 percent of total establishments and 88 per-
cent of employment in the manufacturing sector in 1990 (Table 7).: ;:
Table 7 - Hong Kong Manufacturing Firms and Employees 1960-1990
Number of firms
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Source: Sit and Wong [1989], Chau [1993].24
Interestingly, SMEs were able to expand their share in total manufactur-
ing— in terms of gross output from 65 percent in the early 1960s to
83 percent in.the early 1990s. A closer examination of the statistics-sug-
gests that the shares of small- and medium-to-small-sized firms substan-
tially increased whereas the share of medium-to-large-sized firms de-
clined. Growth in manufacturing output in Hong Kong resulted from the
SMEs' rapid increase in number rather than from their increase in size.
A systematic analysis of the factors of growth of SMEs is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, rapid responses to changes in. the market
situation, permanent improvement with respect to product quality and de-
sign, quick and punctual delivery times and a high standard of production
techniques are considered the most important elements behind this dy-
namism [Sit and Wong 1989]. Since the costs of market entry and exit for
SMEs are relatively low, the set-up and fatality rates are high.
Although Hong Kong manufacturing firms are small in size, many of them
are strongly involved in cross-border operations such as trade, subcon-
tracting and even in outward investment. This is mainly facilitated through
two channels: first, through subcontracting networks with larger firms, and
second, through links with trading houses, which are frequently SMEs,
too.
1 Subcontracting Networks
Many Hong Kong small- and medium-sized manufacturers are linked with
other local and foreign factories through a network of contracting ar-
rangements. According to a field survey made in 1987, 27 percent of
SMEs in the sample operated as contractors (which gave out orders) and
16 percent as subcontractors (which received orders). Interestingly, small25
firms are more heavily involved in subcontracting than medium-sized
ones [Sit and Wong 1989].
Table 8 - Hong Kong SMEs with Outward Processing Activities in China






















Source: Sit and Wong [1989].
On average, 20 percent of the sample SMEs had outward processing fa-
cilities in China (Table 8). The share was highest iW'precision equipment-
(27 percent) and lowest in garments (16 percent). Compared to all enter-
prises, SMEs are overrepresented in electronics and precision equipment
and underrepresented in garment and textiles. ....
With respect to employment size, there is an asymmetry between firms in
Hong Kong and firms in the mainland. While Hong Kong manufacturers
involved in subcontracting are relatively small, the average size of their
partner establishment north of the border is a multiple: in 1991, it was
787 employees for factories in the Pearl River Delta. About 40 percent of
firms employed over 500 workers, about 20 percent even over
1,000 workers (Table 9). However, this picture still reflects to a great ex-
tent the historical pattern of manufacturing production under state-owner-
ship, which has been dominated by large-scale factories. However, pro-26
duction under private ownership is rapidly increasing.
3 Compared with
state enterprises, non-state enterprises are generally small [Xu, Kwok, Li
andYan 1995].













Source: Federation of Hong Kong Industries [1993].
2 Export Intermediaries
Many of the Hong Kong outward oriented SMEs make use of effective in-
termediaries for exports and re-exports. There is a strong correlation be-
tween manufacturers' firm size and the mode of their exports: the smaller
the size, the higher the share of indirect exports by interlinking trading
companies [Rhee and Soulier 1989]. The intermediary role played by
trading companies is to collect market information, to facilitate contracts,
to provide product design and specification, to make quality controls, to
secure the intermediate inputs, to bundle and distribute orders, to finance
pre-shipments and to bear the risk of non-payment from buyers.
Hong Kong trading companies handle the bulk of the Chinese trade
(China's imports and exports transmitted through Hong Kong). They have
gained this position not only from Hong Kong's favourable location: an
In 1990 already 60 percent of industrial production in Guangdong Province stemmed
from the non-state sector (1978: 28 percent).27
important advantage is their excellent and often family-based connection
to Chinese-led overseas companies which hold a prominent position in
export and import markets. Consequently, trading companies also play an
important role in the economic integration process in the Pearl River
Delta. .
VI Lessons for Developing Border Regions
The Pearl River Delta provides a unique experience to illustrate the suc-
cessful re-integration of two regions after several decades of political and
economic separation. It also provides interesting insights into the pivotal
role of SMEs in this process. Can the Delta serve as an example for other
developing border regions, in particular in Central Europe along the for-
mer Iron Curtain? The answer is: possibly.
The best way to start learning lessons from success is to look at the
causes: economic integration can be favoured by government actions
facilitating trade and investment across regions, such as lowering or cut-
ting tariff rates or establishing free trade areas. It can also be largely
driven by market forces. In a new book on Hong Kong economy [Enright,
Scott and Dodwell 1996] it is argued that Hong Kong's companies have
prospered in the past mainly by what the book calls the 'hustle factor'.
Actually, the region is particularly rich in entrepreneurs. Most of the enter-
prises in Hong Kong are small to medium in size. They mainly operate in
highly competitive production fields like garment, textiles, toys, watches
and other light consumables and are almost wholly geared to exports.
They are highly integrated among themselves and with larger firms, in
particular through the system of subcontracting. SMEs' advantages ex-
tend to being able to respond rapidly and often efficiently to changes in28
the market. By that, they can find a profitable niche somewhere in the
business network. While the strength of large enterprises heavily relies on
economies of scale, SMEs, linked in groups, can benefit from economies
of scope [Sit and Wong 1989].
There are three key factors contributory to the Delta's economic success:
a non-interventionist policy promoting growth, a pronounced outward ori-
entation in business which consequently exploits complementaries in
comparative advantages and, last but not least, the so-called Chinese
factor — the special attitudes adopted by local entrepreneurs, their adapt-
ability and flexibility, their work ethics and their common cultural heritage:
• Hong Kong's traditional policy of non-interventionism and — begin-
ning in 1979 — China's open-door policy have provided an excellent
atmosphere for "grass root capitalism" [Kraus 1988]. This type of
policy involves a minimum of regulations and gives governments little
influence on business. It is in sharp contrast to the European-style
industrial policy which tends to play an active part in economic devel-
opment.
The primary role of the government in the Delta has been to provide
the adequate and appropriate infrastructure. Thanks to a sophisti-
cated transport and communication network, which has no parallel in
Central European border regions, the costs of doing business are
low. And more important: the business community on both sides of
the border has quickly and efficiently responded by exploiting new
opportunities — unlike on both sides of the former Iron Curtain,
where cross-border activities are relatively rare.29
Hong Kong's traditional outward orientation and China's progressive
opening-up have laid the foundation for a new division of labour in
the Delta. Hong Kong-based manufacturers have access to modern
technology, sales networks and financial sources. Manufacturers in
Hong Kong, large and small, have relocated parts of their production,
in particular the labour- and land-intensive, across the border, pref-
erably by outward processing. Their Chinese partners have willingly
accepted this co-operation, since they have recognized that they
benefit from it. In Central Europe, subcontracting relationships are
frequently considered with mistrust. Particularly, subcontractors in
transition countries complain about "unfair practices" of their part-
ners — about unstable orders, excessive quality requirements and
low prices. However, subcontracting is usually a necessary step to
upgrade a manufacturer's operations. From the Pearl River Delta we
can learn that the spatial division of labour is rapidly changing:
Shenzhen, in the early 1980s a concentrated area of simple process-
ing and assembling of important materials and components, has
stepwise become a center of technology-intensive production. Lower
level subcontracting, in terms of the scale of investment, skills and
wages, has gradually moved into the hinterland.
The Hong Kong, and generally the Chinese type of merchant entre-
preneur, who is ever alert to all sorts of business, seems to have in-
herited a gift for being successful. The European type, in contrast, is
more an industrialist who considers himself as a producer rather than
a trader [Wu 1988, Chau 1993]. This appears to be the main reason
why the Hong Kong/Guangdong model is probably of limited scope
for Central European border regions. Clearly, there are some differ-
ences: Polish local business appears to be more trade-oriented and30
has more successfully proved its ability to adapt quickly to changing
circumstances rather than their Czech or Hungarian counterparts.
However, eight years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, also Polish
border regions vis-a-vis Germany are still far from becoming ah eco-
nomic power-house.
Drawing lessons does not mean to borrow or to reject blindly the experi-
ences of others. Experiences from elsewhere, however, can be used for
inspiration — how to deal better with a problem.31
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